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NO HIDING THE BALL:  
MEDICAL PRIVACY AND PRO SPORTS  
MICHAEL K. MCCHRYSTAL* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Physical performance is the essence of most sports and certainly of the most 
popular American professional spectator sports.  It makes sense that profes-
sional sports teams are particularly concerned with acquiring performance-re-
lated medical information about their players.  Toward that end, teams in the 
leading professional sports leagues employ staff physicians and other personnel 
to evaluate and treat the medical conditions of players. 
Substantial scholarly thought is devoted to the role of team physicians and, 
particularly, to the conflicting interests of which they take account, including 
the interests of the patient-players whom they treat and the teams that employ 
them.1  To cast the conflict in its simplest terms, the long-term health of the 
player and the short-term interest of the team may conflict.  As my colleague, 
Professor Matthew Mitten, has noted, “The team physician has the potentially 
conflicting responsibilities of providing medical care to the players and protect-
ing their health while also facilitating the club’s ability to win games by having 
its best players on the field.”2   
The conflicts of interest confronted by team physicians form an important 
component of an even larger set of concerns related to the privacy or transpar-
ency of information about player health.  Players can be conflicted about 
whether or not to seek treatment for a nagging injury and risk loss of playing 
time.  Teams may be hesitant to disclose a key player’s injury for fear that it 
will assist an opponent in developing its game plan.  The National Football 
League (NFL) has been accused of fraudulently concealing the health risks to 
                                         
* Professor of Law, Marquette University.  My thanks to Joffrey Van Nostrand, who provided ex-
cellent research assistance. 
1 See Steve P. Calandrillo, Sports Medicine Conflicts: Team Physicians vs. Athlete Patients, 50 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 185, 187–88 (2005); Barry R. Furrow, The Problem of the Sports Doctor: Serving Two 
(or Is It Three or Four?) Masters, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 165, 168, 172–73, 183 (2005); Matthew J. 
Mitten, Team Physicians and Competitive Athletes: Allocating Legal Responsibility for Athletic Inju-
ries, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 129, 131, 140–41, 168 (1993).  
2 Matthew J. Mitten, Team Physicians as Co-Employees: A Prescription That Deprives Professional 
Athletes of an Adequate Remedy for Sports Medicine Malpractice, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 211, 212 (2005). 
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players caused by concussion injuries,3 thus concealing from the players the full 
extent of medical risks to which their injuries had exposed them. 
What we encounter, then, in considering the privacy or transparency of 
medical information about professional athletes, are complex forces of short-
term and long-term interests on the part of various stakeholders.  Players, 
healthcare providers, teams, and leagues all have their own complicated inter-
ests when it comes to discovering and disclosing medical information about 
players. 
This article is an effort to sort out some of the privacy and transparency 
issues implicated by the centrality of player health to team performance in lead-
ing professional sports leagues.  Part II of this article outlines, in general terms, 
the law that governs privacy of medical information.  Part III describes the con-
tractual structures in the various leagues governing disclosure of medical infor-
mation by players and the incentives for players to withhold information.  Part 
IV concerns the contractual structures and the extent to which they require or 
permit disclosure of player medical information by teams. 
This article is limited to the extent and nature of privacy interests in medical 
information concerning professional athletes in Major League Baseball (MLB), 
the National Basketball Association (NBA), the National Hockey League 
(NHL), and the NFL.  The available evidence with respect to these leagues leads 
to some unsurprising conclusions: Players in these leagues bargain away most 
of the privacy protection provided by federal law, even though the incentives 
for players to conceal medical problems sometimes are strong.  Teams have a 
strong interest in gaining comprehensive information about player health for 
economic and competition reasons, and they have mixed interests in sharing that 
information with their league and the public.  The leagues have a strong interest 
in the medical condition of players, particularly related to fair competition, and 
they, too, have mixed interests in sharing that information with the public, par-
ticularly as it may affect public perception of their sport.  In other words, player 
medical information is valuable to all stakeholders, but there are reasons that 
each stakeholder may not want the information to go any further. 
II.  HEALTH CARE PRIVACY LAW AND THE DOCTRINE OF CONSENT 
The privacy of information collected in the course of health care is protected 
                                         
3 Plaintiffs’ Amended Master Admin. Long-Form Complaint, at Count IV, ¶ 4, In re Nat’l Football 
League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., No. 2:12-md-02323-AB, (E.D. Pa. July 17, 2012) (case set-
tled July 7, 2014) (2014 WL 3054250). 
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under federal law,4 state statutes,5 and common law.6  The Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)7 directed the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to promulgate regulations 
concerning health information privacy applicable to most health care providers.8   
The privacy of medical information is important for practical reasons and 
to protect the dignity and autonomy of the individual.  Among the most com-
pelling practical reasons to guard privacy about health issues is the patient’s 
pocketbook, particularly in cases where employment opportunities might be ad-
versely affected by health concerns.  This is, of course, an issue of enormous 
importance to professional athletes.    
Even beyond pocketbook concerns, health issues can strongly affect a per-
son’s self- and public image.  Medical concerns are often associated with a phys-
ical deficiency, and professional athletes take particular pride in their physical 
accomplishments and the positive image they associate with those accomplish-
ments.9   
So, on the one hand, medical privacy is taken seriously by many people and 
by the law.  On the other hand, legal protection for medical privacy is generally 
subject to the significant limitation that privacy is lost when the patient consents 
to disclosure.  With respect to the privacy interests of professional athletes, 
HHS, in responding to a comment on its proposed privacy rules—which are 
now final—said the following:  
 
Professional sports teams are unlikely to be covered entities [, 
which owe primary duties of confidentiality under the regula-
tions].  Even if a sports team were to be a covered entity, em-
ployment records of a covered entity are not covered by this 
Rule.  If this comment is suggesting that the records of profes-
sional athletes should be deemed “employment records” even 
                                         
4 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–191, § 2713, 110 
Stat. 1936 (1996) [hereinafter HIPAA]; HIPAA Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(5) (2013). 
5 See Joy L. Pritts, Altered States: State Health Privacy Laws and the Impact of the Federal Health 
Privacy Rule, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 327, 332–40, 349–50 (2002). 
6 The physician-patient relationship generally entails a duty of confidentiality that has been extended 
to other health care providers.  This principle of the common law has informed the scope of the eviden-
tiary privilege with respect to information supplied to health care providers, including psychotherapists.  
See generally Peter A. Winn, Confidentiality in Cyberspace: The HIPAA Privacy Rules and the Com-
mon Law, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 617 (2002). 
7 HIPAA, supra note 4, at § 2713. 
8 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(5). 
9 There are many thoughtful discussions on the importance of privacy to individual personality. See, 
e.g., ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 
89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006).  
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when created or maintained by health care providers and health 
plans, the Department disagrees.  No class of individuals should 
be singled out for reduced privacy protections.  As noted in the 
preamble to the December 2000 Rule, nothing in this Rule pre-
vents an employer, such as a professional sports team, from 
making an employee's agreement to disclose health records a 
condition of employment.  A covered entity, therefore, could 
disclose this information to an employer pursuant to an author-
ization.10 
 
The operating principle suggested by HHS is that a player may be com-
pelled to authorize the release of medical information to his team without vio-
lating federal health care privacy regulations under HIPAA.  Therefore, players 
can be compelled to consent to disclosure of information about their medical 
condition without violating privacy principles under federal law.  The same is 
generally true under state law.11  
III.  DISCLOSURE OF MEDICAL INFORMATION BY THE PLAYER   
The four most celebrated Untied States and Canadian professional sports 
leagues—MLB, the NBA, the NFL, and the NHL—rely on certain controlling 
documents in establishing their policies relating to players’ medical infor-
mation.12  Generally, for these four leagues, similar contractual structures are in 
place.  Each league has a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that is negoti-
ated between the league, representing the owners and teams, and the players, 
represented by the player union.  Each league’s CBA regulates, to some extent, 
the health, safety, and right to medical care of athletes employed in the league.13  
For each league, the CBA is supplemented by a uniform player contract that 
also addresses issues concerning player health.14 
                                         
10 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,182, 
53,193 (Aug. 14, 2002) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160 & 164). 
11 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 146.82(1) (2011–2012) (“All patient health care records shall remain con-
fidential.  Patient health care records may be released only to the persons designated in this section or 
to other persons with the informed consent of the patient or of a person authorized by the patient.”). 
12 See infra note 13. 
13 See MLB COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. XIII (2012–2016) [hereinafter MLB 
CBA]; NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. XXII (2011) [hereinafter NBA CBA]; NFL 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. 39 (2011) [hereinafter NFL CBA]; NHL COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. 34 (2012 – 2022) [hereinafter NHL CBA]. 
14 See MLB CBA, supra note 13, at sched. A, ¶6.(b) [hereinafter MLB UNIFORM PLAYER’S 
CONTRACT]; NBA CBA, supra note 13, at exhibit A, ¶ 7(b)(d)(f)(h) [hereinafter NBA UNIFORM 
PLAYER CONTRACT]; NFL CBA, supra note 13,  at app. A, ¶¶ 8, 13 [hereinafter NFL PLAYER 
CONTRACT]; NHL CBA, supra note 13, at exhibit 1, ¶¶ 3, 5(a)(b) [hereinafter NHL STANDARD 
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A.  Player’s Duty to Submit to Medical Examination 
Health care in the big leagues often starts with a medical history and a phys-
ical examination conducted before the prospective player is even signed to a 
contract.15  Unsurprisingly, one of the most important factors a team will con-
sider in drafting a prospective player is the health and medical condition of the 
athlete.16  A medical examination conducted by a team can severely impact a 
player’s chance not only of getting drafted, but also the player’s future employ-
ment once he lands a spot in the league.17   
Among the four leagues, only the NBA CBA specifically governs pre-draft 
medical examinations.18  The NBA CBA provides: 
 
Prior to any NBA Draft, the NBA and/or its Teams, acting 
jointly, may request that persons eligible . . . voluntarily submit 
to the administration of standardized medical or laboratory tests 
. . . and intelligence and/or personality tests, the results of which 
shall be made available to any Team upon request, but which 
shall be kept confidential from the public and the media.19   
 
The permissive language is important: Top players entering the NBA draft 
routinely skip the NBA Scouting Combine, which means they also skip the med-
ical exams provided for in the CBA.20  Instead, the player’s condition can be 
assessed through individual workouts with teams that may draft the player.21  
One reason a player may opt out of the league’s various tests is that, under the 
CBA, the results are “made available to any Team upon request.”22  The pre-
draft medical examinations could expose a prior injury or condition that might 
affect the player’s long-term value, either in terms of an initial contract or a 
contract down the road.  A player may prefer to skip these tests and, instead, 
test individually with teams so that the medical information stays within that 
                                         
PLAYER’S CONTRACT]. 
15 See Dave Siebert, An Inside Look Into the NFL Medical Exam Process at the Combine, BLEACHER 




18 NBA CBA, supra note 13, at art. XXII, § 4. 
19 Id. 
20 Scott Howard-Cooper, Teams Won’t Be Deterred If Top Prospects Skip Draft Combine, NBA 
(May 14, 2014), http://www.nba.com/2014/news/05/14/draft-combine-prospects-skip/. 
21 Id. 
22 NBA CBA, supra note 13, at art. XXII, § 4. 
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organization rather than being disseminated throughout the league.   
The NFL, the most violent of the professional sports, provides for medical 
examinations of players in its Player Contract.23  As for prospective players, the 
original purpose of the NFL Scouting Combine was to have all the draft-eligible 
players come to one place and undergo medical evaluations and examinations.24  
While there is no controlling clause in the NFL CBA or Player Contract with 
respect to draftees, it has apparently become an accepted practice that if you are 
attending the NFL Combine, you must submit yourself to a medical examination 
by any team that requests it.25  Players are subjected to a battery of tests per-
formed by the individual doctors and physicians of every team that is interested 
in the player; this could mean the player may be subject to thirty-two different 
rounds of tests.26  The results of these exams are kept confidential by the teams, 
but again, they may have major economic consequences, presently and in the 
future, for the prospective players involved.27   
Players who have not yet been drafted and, thus, are not yet members of 
their respective leagues’ players unions, have asserted unsuccessfully that the 
CBA provisions governing players should not apply to them.28  Those unsuc-
cessful challenges have served to reinforce the regime in which medical testing 
of professional players begins before they land a contract and continues 
throughout their careers. 
The leagues’ uniform or standard player contracts require players, implicitly 
or explicitly, to make themselves available for medical examinations.29  Each of 
the standard player contracts contains some form of language stating that the 
player agrees that he will remain in top physical condition and is physically able 
to perform up to the best of his abilities.30  Due to the physically demanding 
nature of professional sports, teams require players to represent that they are in 
                                         
23 NFL PLAYER CONTRACT, supra note 14, at ¶ 8. 
24 See Jene Bramel, Welcome, RB19.  The NFL Will See You Now: The Combine Medical Exam,  
FOOTBALLGUYS (Feb. 18, 2014), http://subscribers.footballguys.com/apps/article.php?arti-
cle=14bramel_combine_medical_exam. 
25 See Siebert, supra note 15.  See also Len Pasquarelli, Physical Exam Most Dreaded Part of Com-
bine, ESPN (Mar. 1, 2002), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfldraft/columnist?id=1343355. 
26 See Pasquarelli, supra note 25; Siebert, supra note 15.  
27 See id. 
28 Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 138–39 (2d Cir. 2004); Wood v. Nat’l Basketball 
Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954, 960 (2d Cir. 1987). 
29 See MLB UNIFORM PLAYER’S CONTRACT, supra note 14; NBA UNIFORM PLAYER CONTRACT, 
supra note 14; NFL PLAYER CONTRACT, supra note 14; NHL STANDARD PLAYER’S CONTRACT, supra 
note 14. 
30 See NBA UNIFORM PLAYER CONTRACT, supra note 14, at exhibit A, ¶ 7(a); NFL PLAYER 
CONTRACT, supra note 14, at app. A, ¶ 8; NHL STANDARD PLAYER’S CONTRACT, supra note 14, at 
exhibit 1, ¶ 2(b).  See also MLB UNIFORM PLAYER’S CONTRACT, supra note 14, at sched. A, ¶ 7.(b) 
(“[T]he Player shall . . . keep himself in first-class physical condition . . . .”). 
MCCHRYSTAL FINAL FORMATTED  1/21/2015  11:21 AM 
2014] MEDICAL PRIVACY AND PRO SPORTS  169 
top physical condition, and the teams assert the right to examine players to as-
sure themselves that this is so.31 
B.  Player’s Duty of Candor 
Players in MLB, the NBA, and the NFL agree to disclose medical infor-
mation about themselves.32  The NBA Uniform Player Contract requires that, 
 
The Player agrees to provide to the Team’s coach, trainer, or 
physician prompt notice of any injury, illness, or medical con-
dition suffered by him that is likely to affect adversely the 
Player’s ability to render the services required under this Con-
tract, including the time, place, cause, and nature of such injury, 
illness, or condition.33   
 
An NFL player agrees “to make full and complete disclosure of any physical 
or mental condition known to him [that] might impair his performance.”34  A 
MLB “[p]layer represents that he has no physical or mental defects known to 
him and unknown to the appropriate representative of the Club that would pre-
vent or impair performance of his services.”35   
The standard of candor expected of MLB and NFL players seems especially 
high in that it extends to any condition that “would impair”36 (MLB) or “might 
impair”37 (the NFL) the player’s performance.  It is not a standard, however, 
without limits.  Certain medical conditions that would be regarded as quite sen-
sitive, such as sexually transmitted diseases, often would not relate to the 
player’s performance for the team.38  Mental health issues also are likely beyond 
                                         
31 Id. 
32 MLB UNIFORM PLAYER’S CONTRACT, supra note 14, at sched. A, ¶ 4(b); NBA UNIFORM PLAYER 
CONTRACT, supra note 14, at exhibit A, ¶ 7(d); NFL PLAYER CONTRACT, supra note 14, at app. A, ¶ 
8.  The NHL CBA and Standard Player’s Contract are less explicit about the player’s duty of candor 
than are comparable documents in the other leagues.  The NHL Standard Player’s Contract does pro-
vide, “The Club may from time to time during the continuance of this SPC establish reasonable rules 
governing the conduct and conditioning of the Player, and such reasonable rules shall form part of this 
SPC and the Agreement as fully as if herein written.”  NHL STANDARD PLAYER’S CONTRACT, supra 
note 14, at exhibit 1, ¶ 4. 
33 NBA UNIFORM PLAYER CONTRACT, supra note 14, at exhibit A, ¶ 7(d). 
34 NFL PLAYER CONTRACT, supra note 14, at app. A, ¶ 8. 
35 MLB UNIFORM PLAYER’S CONTRACT, supra note 14, at sched. A, ¶ 4(b). 
36 Id. 
37 NFL PLAYER CONTRACT, supra note 14, at app. A ¶ 8. 
38 See MLB UNIFORM PLAYER’S CONTRACT, supra note 14, at sched. A, ¶ 4(b); NFL PLAYER 
CONTRACT, supra note 14, at app. A, ¶ 8. 
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the player’s duty of candor.39 
The willingness of players to meet high standards of candor about their 
playing condition may be doubted.  In a midseason poll of players conducted in 
2012, over half responded that they would try to hide concussion symptoms to 
keep playing.40   
Big-time players delivering big-time plays while playing hurt are legendary 
in sports.  A classic illustration is Kirk Gibson’s walk-off home run in the first 
game of the 1988 World Series.41  Gibson, an all-star who was selected as Na-
tional League Most Valuable Player in 1988, injured his leg so severely in the 
league championship series that he was held out of the lineup for the first game 
of the World Series, not even taking batting practice on the day of the game.42  
He signaled to Coach Tommy Lasorda in the bottom of the ninth, with his team 
trailing by a run, that he thought he was fit enough to pinch hit, and that he did, 
hitting a two-out, two-strike, walk-off home run and limping around the bases 
to win the game for his team.43 
Another celebrated case in point: MLB star Miguel Cabrera, of the Detroit 
Tigers, played in the 2013 World Series while suffering various injuries.44  “He's 
not 100 percent,” his manager, Jim Leyland, said at the time.45  “He's been play-
ing in a lot of pain. He's a real tough guy. I think if anybody knew the pain he's 
playing in, they probably wouldn't believe it.”46 
Playing hurt is an expected part of the game.  Great players in their prime, 
like Kirk Gibson and Miguel Cabrera, are likely to stay in the lineup even if 
they are not 100% healthy.  Players who are considered more dispensable to the 
team have more reason to conceal injuries that may impair their performance.  
They may lose playing time, or even a spot on the team, if coaches know they 
are injured and may play below their potential. 
                                         
39 William C. Rhoden, With No One Looking, a Hurt Stays Hidden, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/30/sports/with-no-one-looking-mental-illness-in-athletes-can-stay-
hidden.html?pagewanted=all. 
40 NFL Concussion Poll: 56 Percent of Players Would Hide Symptoms to Stay on Field, SPORTING 
NEWS (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.sportingnews.com/nfl/story/2012-11-11/nfl-concussions-hide-
symptoms-sporting-news-midseason-players-poll. 
41 See Tom Lasorda, Gibson’s Homer in Lasorda’s Words, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2008), http://arti-
cles.latimes.com/2008/oct/16/sports/sp-lasorda16. 
42 Id.  
43 NFL Concussion Poll, supra note 40. 
44 See Associated Press, Miguel Cabrera’s Health a Concern, ESPN, 
http://espn.go.com/mlb/playoffs/2013/story/_/id/9760412/2013-mlb-playoffs-miguel-cabrera-detroit-
tigers-playing-lot-pain-jim-leyland-says (last updated Oct. 3, 2013). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
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Players have additional reasons to conceal injuries if those injuries are suf-
fered outside of the game.  In one manner or another, the leagues disclaim any 
responsibility for non-work-related injuries or conditions that a player may suf-
fer, and they take steps to avoid the risks of those injuries.47  The NHL, for 
example, prohibits players from participating in other sports without the consent 
of the team,48 and a team may suspend a player without pay if a non-work-re-
lated medical condition renders him “unfit to play skilled hockey.”49  Similarly, 
the NFL Player Contract prohibits players from “engag[ing] in any activity other 
than football [that] may involve a significant risk of personal injury,”50 and the 
NFL CBA permits the team to suspend the player without pay if the player “is 
unavailable to the team due to a nonfootball injury” resulting from such an ac-
tivity.51 
These sorts of provisions have been relevant in a few publicized cases.  For 
example, Kellen Winslow II, a tight-end for the Cleveland Browns, seriously 
injured his knee (torn ACL) while riding his motorcycle, causing him to miss 
an entire season,52 and Vladimir Radmanovic, a player with the Los Angeles 
Lakers, separated his shoulder while snowboarding, an activity forbidden in his 
contract.53 
The salient point is that while contractual agreements between the player 
and the league establish a duty of candor with respect to the player’s physical 
condition, a player may be hesitant to disclose either the fact of an injury or its 
cause.  Candor about such matters may, in some circumstances, be harmful eco-
nomically to the player.  There also may be some hesitation in complaining 
about injuries that the player believes—or hopes—are minor, especially consid-
ering the culture of toughness that plays such a dominant role in professional 
sports. 
C.  Player’s Right to Treatment 
Each league’s CBA provides players with access to medical treatment for 
employment-related conditions at the teams’ expense.54  The NHL CBA, for 
                                         
47 See NFL PLAYER CONTRACT, supra note 14, at app. A, ¶ 3; NHL STANDARD PLAYER’S 
CONTRACT, supra note 14, at exhibit 1, ¶ 7. 
48 NHL STANDARD PLAYER’S CONTRACT, supra note 14, at exhibit 1, ¶ 7. 
49 Id. at ¶ 5(b). 
50 NFL PLAYER CONTRACT, supra note 14, at app. A, ¶ 3. 
51 NFL CBA, supra note 13, at art. 4, § 9(a). 
52 ESPN.com News Services, Sources: Player’s Contract Forbids Riding a Motorcycle, ESPN, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2051653 (last updated May 4, 2005). 
53 ESPN.com News Services, Radmanovic Fined by Lakers for Lying about Injury, ESPN, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=2784898 (last updated Mar. 2, 2007).  
54 See generally MLB CBA, supra note 13, at art. XIII; NBA CBA, supra note 13, at art. XXII; 
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example, provides that “[e]ach Club shall provide its Players with high quality 
health care appropriate to their needs as elite professional hockey players.”55  
The NFL promises players the availability of specialized care in orthopedics, 
neurology, and cardiovascular disease.56  
The NFL and the NHL agreements also have explicit language providing 
that team physicians owe their primary obligation to the players, not the team.57  
Even so, team physicians are expected to share medical information concerning 
players with coaches and others in the organization.  The physician’s freedom 
to disclose players’ medical information to team officials is quite explicit in the 
NBA CBA: “A Team physician may disclose all relevant medical information 
concerning a player to (i) the General Manager, coaches, and trainers of the 
Team by which such player is employed . . . .”58 
Similarly, the “Authorization for the Use and/or Disclosure of Major 
League Player Health Information”59 implements the requirement of full disclo-
sure with respect to player health expressed in MLB CBA Article XIII.60  The 
MLB Authorization permits disclosure to team officials of medical information 
about the player and “applies to all health information” in the possession of 
“[a]ll health care providers” with whom the player has “consulted pursuant to 
[his] Uniform Player’s Contract (‘UPC’), the Basic Agreement, or for a work-
related disability, injury, illness or condition.”61   
The contractual agreement across the leagues is that the team can require 
players to submit to medical examinations, during which players have a duty of 
                                         
NFL CBA, supra note 13, at art. 39; NHL CBA, supra note 13, at art. 34. 
55 NHL CBA, supra note 13, at art. 34, § 34.1(a).  See also MLB CBA, supra note 13, at art. XIII; 
NBA CBA, supra note 13, at art. XXII; NFL CBA, supra note 13, at art. 39.  
56 NFL CBA, supra note 13, at art. 39, § 1(b). 
57 Id. at art. 39 § 1(c) (“[E]ach Club [physician’s] primary duty in providing player medical care 
shall be not to the Club but instead to the player-patient.”).  See also NHL CBA, supra note 13, at art. 
34, § 34.1(b) (“The primary professional duty of all individual health care professionals, such as team 
physicians, . . . shall be to the Player-patient regardless of the fact that he/she . . . is retained by such 
Club to diagnose and treat Players.”).   
58 NBA CBA, supra note 13, at art. XXII, § 3(a). 
59 MLB CBA, supra note 13, at attachment 18, § 1 [hereinafter MLB AUTHORIZATION]. 
60 MLB CBA, supra note 13, at art. XIII, § G(1).  
 
Each year upon reporting to spring training, or upon signing a Major League Uniform 
Player’s Contract (“UPC”) for that season, whichever is earlier, each Player must, con-
sistent with Paragraph 6(b)(1) of the UPC, execute the Authorization for the Use and/or 
Disclosure of Major League Player Health Information (“Authorization”) attached as At-
tachment 18 hereto.  
 
Id.  
61 MLB AUTHORIZATION, supra note 59, at attachment 18, §§ 1–2. 
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candor.  In addition to and in furtherance of the duty of candor, players are re-
quired to report injuries to the team physician.  Players are entitled to expert 
medical care that is focused on the player’s health, but teams have a right to be 
informed of information about a player’s ability to perform. 
D.  Player’s Right to a Second Opinion 
Team physicians perform their services under a potential conflict of interest 
in that their player-patient’s interest and their team-employer’s interest could 
lead to different decisions affecting the player’s health.62  Team physicians 
make judgments that can adversely affect a player’s long-term health and his 
ability to earn a living. 
The power of team physicians to impact the careers of players is strikingly 
illustrated by the weight attached to the physicians’ decisions as to whether or 
not a player is medically fit to play.  For example, the NBA Uniform Player 
Contract provides that a player may be suspended if, “in the judgment of the 
Team’s physician, [the player is] unfit to play skilled basketball” for reasons 
other than a work-related injury.63  The NFL Player Contract also provides that, 
“If [a] Player fails to . . . maintain his excellent physical condition to the satis-
faction of the Club physician, . . . then Club may terminate this contract.”64 
Given the responsibility vested in the team physician, it is no surprise that 
the players associations in each league have achieved, in their respective CBAs, 
the right of a player to secure a second medical opinion.  The MLB CBA, for 
example, provides that, “[A] Player may seek a ‘second evaluation’ from a med-
ical specialist . . . provided that the Player is not absent from the Club for an 
unreasonable period of time.”65  Players are not only allowed to get advice or 
evaluations from these secondary medical opinions, but MLB teams are re-
quired to pay for all reasonable costs associated with the trip.66   
                                         
62 See Calandrillo, supra note 1; Furrow, supra note 1; Mitten, supra note 1. 
63 NBA UNIFORM PLAYER CONTRACT, supra note 14, at exhibit A, ¶ 7(b). 
64 NFL PLAYER CONTRACT, supra note 14, at app. A, ¶ 8. 
65 MLB CBA, supra note 13, at art. XIII, § D.  The team is required to pay the cost of a second 
medical opinion (unless it otherwise agrees in writing) only if the secondary evaluation is undertaken 
by a physician on the “accepted listing of medical specialists, by specialty and by geographic region” 
and only if advance notice is given by the player.  Id.  
66 Id.  But see MLB CBA, supra note 13, at art. XIII, § G(2)(a).  
 
A Player is not required to provide his Club with notice of a consultation or evaluation of a 
Work-Related Injury by a health care provider who is not affiliated with the Club provided 
that the Player: (i) receives no treatment in connection with the consultation or evaluation; 
(ii) does not submit to an invasive test or procedure; and (iii) is not invoking his right to a 
Second Medical Opinion under Section D of this Article. In addition, if such an evaluation 
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The teams want to stay in the loop when a player seeks a second medical 
opinion.  The NBA Uniform Player Contract provides that if a player decides to 
consult his own physician, he must notify the team and authorize the physician 
to disclose the results of the examination to the extent that they may affect the 
player’s performance.67  The NFL and NHL CBAs have special provisions, gen-
erally requiring collaboration between the player and the team, in the event that 
a player requires surgery.68  
IV.  DISCLOSURE OF MEDICAL INFORMATION BY THE TEAM 
As between the player and the team, the guiding principle of disclosure of 
medical information is transparency.  How well this principle is applied is open 
to some doubt.  As noted, players may have economic reasons to be less than 
candid with the team.  Moreover, commentators have suggested that the team 
may be less concerned with the player’s health than with the player’s availabil-
ity to perform and, so, fall short on candor, as well.69  The concussion class 
action lawsuit against the NFL provides some support for these commentators’ 
views.70   
Although transparency of medical information between the player and the 
team may be imperfect, the team is bound to have substantial medical infor-
mation about players’ medical information that is also of considerable interest 
to the league, other teams, fans, and various other stakeholders in the world of 
professional sports.   
League documents address, in varying ways, a team’s freedom or duty to 
disclose a player’s medical information to the league, other teams, and the pub-
lic.71   
                                         
or consultation was not authorized by the Club, the Club will not be responsible under Reg-
ulation 2 of the UPC for any expenses incurred by the Player in connection with it. 
 
Id.  
67 NBA UNIFORM PLAYER CONTRACT, supra note 14, at exhibit A, ¶ 7(h). 
68 See NFL CBA, supra note 13, at art. 39, § 5; NHL CBA, supra note 13, at art. 34, § 34.5. 
69 See Calandrillo, supra note 1, at 191–92; Furrow, supra note 1, at 171; Mitten, supra note 1, at 
140. 
70 See generally Plaintiffs’ Amended Master Admin. Long-Form Complaint, supra note 3. 
71 See MLB CBA, supra note 13, at art. XIII, § G(4); NBA CBA, supra note 13, at art. XXII, § 3(d); 
NHL CBA, supra note 13, at art. 34, § 34.3(c).  The NFL CBA contains little concerning medical 
disclosures, while the NFL Constitution densely defines player categories, in part based on a player’s 
medical status.  See NFL CBA, supra note 13, at art. 39.  See also CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF 
THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, art. XVII, § 17.1(A) (2010) [hereinafter NFL CONSTITUTION]. 
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A.  Disclosure to the League 
Teams disclose player medical information to their league for a number of 
reasons.  One essential feature of the leagues is a set of rules governing the 
rosters of teams, including the number and status of players permitted on a 
team.72  Those rules take account of player injuries, particularly where a player 
who is under contract is unavailable by reason of a medical condition to play 
for his team.73 
The NFL has particularly complex rules governing player status, much of it 
related to the medical injury of the player involved.74  For example, an NFL 
player who is injured might be classified as Reserve/Injured, Reserve/Physically 
Unable to Perform (Reserve/PUP), or Reserve/Non-Football Illness/Injury (Re-
serve/NF/I).75  Each status has a distinct impact on the team’s roster and the 
availability of the player to play, or even to practice with the team.  The league’s 
management of team rosters, a crucial aspect of balanced competition, requires 
that the league receive some information regarding the affected player’s medical 
condition.76  Of course, these medically related status determinations affect the 
NFL player as well as the team, and, in some circumstances, the player may 
challenge the status that he was given by the team.77 
Beyond these official player statuses,  
 
NFL coaching staffs are required to provide an injury report 
that is updated throughout the week. On these reports, players 
are listed as:  
 
Inactive (IA) [–] Players are officially inactive for the cur-
rent game and will not play[;] 
 
Out (O) – Not scheduled to play[;]  
 
Doubtful (D) – Players have approximately a 25% chance 
of playing[;]  
 
                                         
72 MLB CBA, supra note 13, at art. XV, § E(1); NBA CBA, supra note 13, at art. XXIX, § 1; NFL 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 71, at art. XVII, § 17.1(A); NHL CBA, supra note 13, at art. 16, § 16.4(a). 
73 See id. 
74 NFL CONSTITUTION, supra note 71, at art. XVII, § 17.1(A).  
75 Id.  
76 See NFL CONSTITUTION, supra note 71, at art. XVII. 
77 See, e.g., NFL CBA, supra note 13, at art. 44. 
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Questionable (Q) – Players have approximately a 50% 
chance of playing[;]  
 
Probable (P) – Players are very likely to start in the upcom-
ing week.78 
 
Some NFL coaches have been accused of gaming the reports to the league.  
For example, two former New England Patriots players claimed that they were 
reported to the league as injured when they were not.79  One study suggests that 
over-reporting injuries is a common practice in the NFL.80  Bill Belichick, the 
Patriots’ coach who is accused of gaming reports, suggests that it is almost im-
possible to over-report player injuries: 
 
“We have to give an injury report daily, before the game, the 
Friday injury report with the league ... [sic]” Belichick said. 
“Every week it's required. So it isn't about anybody wanting or 
not wanting to do anything. It's whatever it is it is. That's the 
way we do it.[”] 
 
“We've played four preseason games, this is our ninth regular-
season game, so we've played 13 consecutive weeks, plus two 
weeks of training camp before that, plus however many prac-
tices we've had. So who do we think that's playing is 100 per-
cent in that locker room? I mean, let's list those guys. Who is 
on that list? I don't know. It would be a real short one. It's the 
middle of the football season. Everybody on that team who's 
playing has got something. Guys on the practice squad have 
stuff.[”] 
 
“Not saying it's, you know, it makes them doubtful or anything. 
I'm just saying it's playing football and that's part of it. I don't 
think any player in the league who's played that much football 
feels a whole 100 percent. I can't imagine. Name another player 
                                         
78 Injury Report and Inactives, NFL, http://www.nfl.com/fantasyfootball/help/injuryreport (last vis-
ited Nov. 19, 2014).  
79 Michael David Smith, Spikes, Talib Say Patriots File False Injury Reports, NBC SPORTS (Mar. 
19, 2014), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2014/03/19/spikes-talib-say-patriots-file-false-injury-
reports/.  
80 Anthony Zonfrelli, Inaccuracies in the Injury Report Across the NFL, HARV. COLL. SPORTS 
ANALYSIS COLLECTIVE (Nov. 6, 2013), http://harvardsportsanalysis.org/?p=4520. 
MCCHRYSTAL FINAL FORMATTED  1/21/2015  11:21 AM 
2014] MEDICAL PRIVACY AND PRO SPORTS  177 
in the league that's fresh as a daisy in the beginning of Novem-
ber after nine regular-season games and six weeks of training 
camp and preseason games before that. Who would that be? If 
all the guys who didn't feel 100 percent didn't practice, we'd 
probably have two people out at practice. Maybe not even 
that.”81 
 
Belichick’s assessment notwithstanding, it is possible that some NFL 
coaches see a tactical advantage in over-reporting injuries.  If opposing teams 
are uncertain of what players they will face or what an opposing player’s con-
dition will be, that could affect their preparation for the game.  How much time 
should a team spend in preparation for an injured starter who has one set of 
tendencies as opposed to a back-up who has a different set of tendencies?  Hid-
ing the ball with respect to what personnel will take the field and what their 
condition will be could provide the tactical advantage of misdirection and sur-
prise.  Of course, this rationale could apply equally to under-reporting injuries 
as to over-reporting them.  The element of surprise, potentially, is served by any 
false reporting. 
Required reports to the league concerning player medical information are 
somewhat less expansive in MLB.82  The Office of the Commissioner of MLB 
may receive player medical information, 
 
[W]hen a Player’s medical and/or health condition is at issue in 
a grievance or a potential grievance. The medical or health in-
formation also shall be provided to the Office of the Commis-
sioner (with a copy to the Association) when such records are 
[relevant] to an investigation of whether the Player violated the 
Basic Agreement, his UPC or Major League Baseball’s Joint 
Drug [Prevention] and Treatment Program, provided that the 
Office of the Commissioner first provides the Association with 
notice of its intent to request such records and an opportunity 
to object.83 
 
This limited disclosure means that the team has a lot of player medical in-
                                         
81 Nick Underhill, Bill Belichick on Injury Talk: 'Name Another Player in the League That's Fresh 
as a Daisy in the Beginning of November,’ MASS LIVE, http://blog.masslive.com/patri-
ots/2013/11/bill_belichick_on_injury_talk.html (last updated Nov. 1, 2013, 6:03 PM). 
82 MLB CBA, supra note 13, at art. XIII, § G(5). 
83 Id. 
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formation that is not shared with the league.  At the same time, because disclo-
sure of player medical information to the public is broadly permitted under the 
MLB CBA,84 the team may be keeping less information confidential than may 
at first appear. 
B.  Disclosure to Other Teams 
The MLB, NBA, and NHL CBAs provide that a team may disclose a 
player’s medical information to another team if an assignment of the player’s 
contract is being contemplated.85  Generally, these disclosures seem in keeping 
with the due diligence that would be expected in purchasing a valuable asset, 
such as a player’s contract.  If the transaction in fact occurs, the new team will 
have information about the player from the team, which it would otherwise be 
contractually entitled to get from the player or to discover through required med-
ical examinations. 
The NFL documents do not appear to contain comparable provisions. In-
stead, teams apparently rely on their own medical examinations of players be-
fore finalizing the assignment of a player’s contract.86 
C.  Disclosure to the Public 
All four leagues provide for some degree of public disclosure of player med-
ical information.87 The relevant provision in the MLB CBA is as follows: 
 
For public relations purposes, a Club may disclose the follow-
ing general information about employment-related injuries: (a) 
the nature of a Player’s injury, (b) the prognosis and the antici-
pated length of recovery from the injury, and (c) the treatment 
                                         
84 Id. at § G(4) (“For public relations purposes, a Club may disclose the following general infor-
mation about employment-related injuries: (a) the nature of a Player’s injury, (b) the prognosis and the 
anticipated length of recovery from the injury, and (c) the treatment and [surgical] procedures under-
taken or anticipated in regard to the injury.”). 
85 Id. at § G(3)(c); NBA CBA, supra note 13, at art. XXII, §§ 3(b)–(c); NHL CBA, supra note 13, 
at art. 34, §34.3(c)(v). 
86 See, e.g., Richard Lezin Jones, Coles Completes a U-Turn and Is Back with the Jets, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 10, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/10/sports/football/10nfl.html?page-
wanted=print&position=&_r=0 (indicating that a trade became final only after the new team completed 
a medical examination of the player); NFL Player’s Life Might Have Been Saved When Tumor Found, 
SPORTING NEWS (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.sportingnews.com/nfl/story/2011-10-20/physical-may-
have-saved-harrisons-life  (“Physical exams are routine on players traded in the NFL, and deals aren't 
complete until all players involved are cleared by doctors.”).  
87 MLB CBA, supra note 13, at art. XIII¶ G(4); NBA CBA, supra note 13, at art. XXII; NFL CBA, 
supra note 13, at art. 39; NHL CBA, supra note 13, at art. 34, § 34.3(c)(iii). 
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and surgical procedures undertaken or anticipated in regard to 
the injury. For any other [medical] condition that prevents a 
Player from rendering services to his Club, a Club may disclose 
only the fact that a medical condition is preventing the Player 
from rendering services to the Club and the anticipated length 
of the Player’s absence from the Club.88 
 
Although not permitting a fine-grained disclosure of player medical infor-
mation, the provision gives the sort of account that, for example, friends might 
share among friends.  The NHL CBA is nearly identical in its scope.89   
The NBA CBA is somewhat more general in its terms, permitting public 
disclosure of player medical information “provided that such information relates 
solely to the reasons why any such player has not been or is not rendering ser-
vices as a player.”90  In addition, the NBA CBA provides an exception for life-
threatening or career-threatening injuries or illnesses and those that are non-
work-related, in which case, players or their families have the right to approve 
the timing and the terms of the disclosure to the public.91   
D.  Medical Information and Gambling  
One commentator, who calls himself “the nation’s most skeptical fan,”92 
suggests that league-required injury reports particularly serve the interests of 
gamblers who rely on such information in placing bets on sports events.93  While 
some studies suggest that sports gambling is largely a game of chance rather 
than superior knowledge,94 those who predict the outcomes of sports events—
for money or otherwise—seem to think differently.95 
If teams and leagues did not disclose player injuries prior to game time as a 
matter of course, people who make money—or believe they will—from player 
                                         
88 MLB CBA, supra note 13, at art. XIII, § G(4). 
89 NHL CBA, supra note 13, at art. 34, § 34.3(c)(iii). 
90 NBA CBA, supra note 13, at art. XXII, § 3(d). 
91 Id. at § 3(e).   
92 Brian Tuohy maintains a website on which he makes the claim. Brian Tuohy, THE FIX IS IN, 
http://thefixisin.net/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).  
93 Brian Tuohy, Why the NFL’s Stance Against Gambling Is Complete BS, BLEACHER REPORT (July 
25, 2009), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/223843-why-the-nfls-stance-against-gambling-is-com-
plete-bs.  See BRIAN TUOHY, LARCENY GAMES: SPORTS GAMBLING, GAME FIXING AND THE FBI 294 
(2013). 
94 Michael Cantinotti, Robert Ladouceur & Christian Jacques, Sports Betting: Can Gamblers Beat 
Randomness?, 18 PSYCH. OF ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORS 143, 145 (2004). 
95 See, e.g., Jon Boswell, Note, Fantasy Sports: A Game of Skill That Is Implicitly Legal under State 
Law, and Now Explicitly Legal under Federal Law, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1257, 1270 (2008). 
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medical information would likely try to gain the information on their own.  
Whether through surveillance, bribery, or other means, players and teams would 
be exposed to wrongful efforts to gain information.96  The current regime of 
public disclosure seems to satisfy the public demand for player medical infor-
mation, whether that information is sought as a matter of general interest or in 
support of sports betting.  
V.  CONCLUSION  
Professional athletes have more reason than most of us to jealously guard 
information about their health.  As people often highly paid for their physical 
abilities, adverse health information can cost professional athletes millions, or 
even end careers.  In addition, endorsements and other income opportunities, 
both during the athlete’s playing days and thereafter, can be affected by the 
player’s image, including aspects of that image that relate to health and vitality. 
Privacy is not costless, however, particularly in professional sports.  Teams 
spend millions relying on the ability of a player to perform at an exceptional 
level.  A concealed health problem can cheat the team of the value for which it 
bargained.   
Professional sports leagues also have a substantial interest in player medical 
information, both for reasons of safety in the sport (and the public perception 
associated with disregard for player safety) and in order to maintain fair com-
petition in terms of team rosters.  In addition, sports fans make substantial emo-
tional and financial investments97 in the anticipated performance of the teams 
that they follow, and the adverse effect of a key player’s concealed health prob-
lem on a team can cause significant loss of value to fans. 
The balance that has been struck, through a process of collective bargaining, 
favors disclosure of player medical information over privacy.  It is difficult to 




                                         
96 See id. 
97 The financial investment can include the cost of attending a game or a wager placed on a game. 
